Understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation by Verreault-Julien, P. (Philippe)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science            (2019) 9:18 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-018-0240-6
ORIGINAL PAPER IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
Philippe Verreault-Julien1
Received: 20 June 2017 / Accepted: 15 November 2018 /
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
One can find in the literature two sets of views concerning the relationship between
understanding and explanation: that one understands only if 1) one has knowledge
of causes and 2) that knowledge is provided by an explanation. Taken together, these
tenets characterize what I call the narrow knowledge account of understanding (nar-
row KAU). While the first tenet has recently come under severe attack, the second
has been more resistant to change. I argue that we have good reasons to reject it on
the basis of theoretical models that provide how-possibly explanations. These mod-
els, while they do not explain in the strict (narrow KAU) sense, afford understanding.
In response, I propose an alternative epistemology of understanding, broad KAU, that
takes cases of theoretical modelling into account.
Keywords Understanding · Explanation · Models · Non-causal · How-possibly
explanations
1 Introduction
The epistemology of understanding has traditionally been related, if not reduced, to
the epistemology of causal explanation. A prominent view about scientific under-
standing (understanding hereafter) is that one understands a phenomenon if and only
if one has knowledge of its cause(s). Pritchard (2014), from whom I borrow the termi-
nology, calls this underlying epistemology of understanding the ‘knowledge account
of understanding’. Jointly with the traditional requirement that only causal explana-
tions can supply this knowledge, I characterize the combination of these two views
as the narrow knowledge account of understanding (narrow KAU hereafter). Narrow
KAU has two tenets: 1) causal knowledge is necessary for understanding and 2) only
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explanations can provide that knowledge.1 The qualifier ‘narrow’ emphasizes that
within narrow KAU, only knowledge of causes is a source of understanding and that
only explanations can provide that knowledge. In other words, it is narrow because it
states that knowing a causal explanation is a necessary condition for understanding.
One important desideratum of an account of understanding is that it provides eval-
uative criteria to demarcate cases of genuine from illusory understanding. The sense
of understanding (see Trout 2002; Ylikoski 2009) can be a misleading cue for genuine
understanding, the state of actually understanding. As such, it must be recognized that
misunderstanding is a live possibility and that in consequence we must have criteria
that are stringent enough.
However, a second important desideratum is that the account does not rule out
large areas of science as not conducive to understanding. A naturalistic outlook on
science should compel philosophers to not attribute systematic and persistent error
across different fields of science (e.g. Hausman 2009, 40). While narrow KAU scores
very well on the first desideratum, it does poorly on the second. It provides clear
and explicit criteria for judging whether understanding is genuine, but at the cost
of making illusory understanding dubiously prevalent. Indeed, as I shall argue, one
implication of narrow KAU is that theoretical modelling often does not afford under-
standing because it does not provide explanations. An account of understanding with
such implication is suspect.
As a matter of fact, an important motivation behind the burgeoning literature on
non-causal explanation (e.g. Baker 2012; Baron et al. 2017; Batterman 2002; Batter-
man and Rice 2014; Lange 2013, 2017; Pincock 2015; Reutlinger 2014; Reutlinger
and Saatsi 2018; Saatsi 2018) is to account for explanatory practices that are inconsis-
tent with narrow KAU’s insistence on causal knowledge. According to this literature,
we can gain understanding of empirical phenomena via explanations that do not rely
on causal facts, therefore challenging narrow KAU.2 For instance, Pincock argues
for a case of ‘abstract explanation’ on a basis that concurs with the second desider-
atum, namely that “[i]t is expert practitioners who should guide our judgements on
cases and influence our philosophical theory of explanation” (2015, 870). Accord-
ing to him, abstract explanations work by classifying systems between which there
are abstract dependence relations. Crucially, abstract explanations do not explain
phenomena by virtue of identifying causal facts. For Pincock, causal and abstract
explanations are hence of a different kind.
Since it is uncontroversial in the explanation and understanding literature that
explanations afford understanding (e.g. de Regt 2009a; Grimm 2010; Khalifa 2017),
cases of non-causal explanations provide persuasive counterexamples to narrow
KAU’s first tenet. Even recent prominent accounts of causal explanation are now
more liberal. For example, despite the fact that their main focus is on causal expla-
nation, Woodward (2003, 220-221) and Strevens (2008, sec. 5.7) briefly indicate
1Whether narrow KAU states sufficient conditions for understanding is a different question. While it
appears prima facie plausible, here I remain agnostic over this issue.
2The recent literature on understanding, while not examining non-causal cases in detail, also rejects the
first tenet of narrow KAU (e.g. de Regt 2017; Greco 2014; Grimm 2014; Khalifa 2017).
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that the criteria they propose for explanatory relevance could also be applied to non-
causal explanations.3 There is now a strong case for what Reutlinger (2016) calls the
“liberal consensus”.4
The second tenet of narrow KAU has been more resistant to change. However, I
believe it ought, like the first tenet, to be rejected because it does not satisfy the sec-
ond desideratum. In the remainder of this paper, I first spell out in more details what
the second tenet of narrow KAU amounts to. Then, I argue that both practitioners’
judgment as well as current philosophical accounts of so-called how-possibly expla-
nations provide good reasons to abandon it. How-possibly explanations present a
challenge to narrow KAU because they do not explain according to it, and yet appear
to afford understanding. I will then propose what I call the broad knowledge account
of understanding (broad KAU hereafter) that builds on a framework developed by
Reutlinger (2016). Broad KAU, I hold, satisfies the two desiderata stated earlier and
hence provides a normatively and descriptively compelling account of understanding.
2 Narrow KAU and the necessity of explanation
If the first tenet of narrow KAU is more controversial, if not debunked, the second
is more widely held. Proponents of this view consider that explanations are the only
legitimate source of understanding, for instance:
The resulting objectivist, ontic, account, in generic form, states that scientific
understanding is the state produced, and only produced, by grasping a true
explanation (Trout 2007, 584-585).
[U]nderstanding amounts to (a) knowing that the explanans is true, (b) knowing
that the explanandum is true, and (c) for some l, knowing that l is the correct ex-
planatory link between the explanans and the explanandum (Khalifa 2012, 26).
An individual has scientific understanding of a phenomenon just in case they
grasp a correct scientific explanation of that phenomenon (Strevens 2013, 510).5
In a nutshell, what these accounts say is that one can’t understand without an
explanation. According to Trout, it is important to separate the sense of understand-
ing, which can be a misleading phenomenology, from the genuine understanding one
can only obtain when being in possession of a true explanation. Khalifa maintains
that a distinct concept of understanding adds nothing to what he calls the “Explana-
tory Model of Understanding” (EMU). For Khalifa, having scientific understanding
is a matter of having explanatory knowledge, i.e., highly virtuous beliefs about an
explanation. Similarly, Strevens argues that what he designates as the “simple view”
adequately depicts the connection between explanation and understanding. For him,
3Woodward’s insight, in particular, has recently received some attention (e.g. Grimm 2010; Pincock 2015;
Reutlinger 2016).
4See, e.g., Skow (2014) or Strevens (2018) for views that challenge this liberal consensus.
5See also Strevens (2008, 3).
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the epistemology of explanation precedes and guides the epistemology of understand-
ing. One understands why something is the case, according to Strevens, when one not
only grasps a state of affairs, but also its correct explanation.
It is important to bear in mind that Strevens and Trout, in particular, do not claim
that knowing an explanation is sufficient for understanding.6 Indeed, the ‘grasp-
ing’ condition may require a state or ability on top of knowledge. This is why
Strevens (2013, 510) does not reduce understanding to explanation. However, grasp-
ing can be related to knowing. Indeed, as Strevens (2013, 513, fn. 6) indicates, his
account is compatible with the view that knowledge is necessary for grasping. Trout
is not as explicit as Strevens, but nevertheless suggests that one might “treat grasping
as a kind of knowing” (2007, 585). In short, perhaps knowing an explanation is not
sufficient—one may need to grasp it—, but to grasp a true explanation one may need
to know it.7 That said, the important point is that one needs to stand in the appropriate
epistemic relation—e.g., knowing, grasping, believing, etc.—with an explanation to
understand. Explanations are the bearer of the information that affords understanding
and without an explanation there is no understanding.
One consequence of these views is to downplay the import of understanding as
a separate and useful notion. For instance, Khalifa (2012) argues that de Regt and
Dieks’s (2005), de Regt’s (2009a, b), and Grimm’s (2010) accounts of understand-
ing do not add anything to our understanding of understanding on top of what EMU
already says. If this is correct, then it indeed makes little sense to spell out the episte-
mic contribution of theoretical models in terms of understanding since explanation is
in fact the key concept. However, Khalifa notes that one way Grimm could demons-
trate the distinctiveness of understanding is “to argue that there are cases of under-
standing without explanation” (2012, 23). For if there can be understanding without
explanation, then it means understanding can’t be fully reduced to explanation. It also
means the epistemology of explanation may not provide all the normative and des-
criptive criteria we need when analysing science. Finding such cases thus holds the
promise of rebutting the second tenet of narrow KAU’s and, more generally, to contri-
bute to our understanding of the relationship between explanation and understanding.
3 Is explanation necessary?
An explanation is essentially just a set of propositions that connects an explanans to
an explanandum in the right way (Strevens 2013). It is uncontroversial that explana-
tions provide the right kind of propositions and structure. Having said that, do we have
good reasons to believe that knowing ‘non-explanatory’ propositions can’t afford
understanding? Put differently, are there sets of propositions that convey information
conducive to understanding, but that do not satisfy the conditions for explanation?
6Khalifa (2013c) argues that the crucial cognitive ability involved in understanding, which we may call
grasping, is the ability to conduct a reliable explanatory evaluation. See also Khalifa and Gadomski (2013).
7There is also a debate over whether understanding, unlike knowledge, can be ‘lucky’ (see, e.g, Hills 2016;
Khalifa 2013c; Morris 2012; van Riel 2016; Rohwer 2014). More minimally, we could say that what is
required is to have true beliefs about the explanation. Nothing here hinges on how this question is settled.
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The strategy I follow here is similar to Lipton’s (2009).8 His strategy is to point
out ways we can obtain the same cognitive benefits (e.g., knowledge of causes or
of possibility) that explanations typically provide, but without having an explana-
tion. According to him, understanding should therefore be identified with the benefits
explanations provide rather than with the explanations themselves.
Similarly, I would like to show that one important source of knowledge con-
ducive to understanding phenomena is studied in the philosophy of science literature
under the label of ‘how-possibly explanations’ (Bokulich 2014; Craver 2006; Forber
2010; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013a, b; Rohwer and Rice 2013; Verreault-Julien 2017, 2018;
Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). How-possibly explanations (HPEs hereafter) are to be
contrasted with how-actually explanations (HAEs hereafter), or explanations simpliciter.
A terminological disclaimer is now essential. As their names suggest, it may seem
that HPEs and HAEs are simply different species of the same genus ‘explanation’.
Were it the case, then arguing as I shall do that having an explanation is not necessary
because HPEs may afford understanding would be beside the point. For if having an
HPE would amount to having an explanation, then it would say nothing about the
necessity of explanation for understanding. So we first need to disentangle in what
sense HPEs relate to the second tenet of narrow KAU.
Contemporary characterizations of HPEs are very similar to what Hempel called
potential explanations (Bokulich 2014).9 According to him, a potential explanation is
“any argument that has the character of a [deductive-nomological] explanation except
that the sentences constituting its explanans need not be true” (Hempel 1965, 338).
In HPEs, what constitutes the explanans is not true or not known to be true. Indeed,
we may simply lack the appropriate justification for believing that a given HPE is,
in fact, a HAE. HAEs, on the other hand, give a correct explanatory account of the
explanandum. Another way of putting it is to say that HPEs satisfy internal conditions
of adequacy—the explanation’s logical structure—whereas HAEs satisfy both inter-
nal and external—empirical correspondence to the world—ones (Strevens 2013).10
For instance, I could, using phlogiston theory, provide an internally correct explana-
tion of the phenomenon of combustion. However, the theory does not actually explain
combustion because there is no such entity as phlogiston. The explanation is false
and does not meet the external conditions of adequacy.11 To give another example,
8Strevens (2013) explicitly disagrees with some of Lipton’s examples, but says nothing about the general
approach. See Khalifa (2013b) for an in-depth analysis of Lipton’s strategy, its success, and limitations.
9See Verreault-Julien (2018) for a detailed analysis of the different accounts of how-possibly explanations.
10What I say here is in principle orthogonal to the scientific realism debate. As Khalifa (2011) argues,
to say that explanation is necessary for understanding does not imply the factivity of the explanans. It
only requires the explanation to be correct according to some metric, e.g., empirical adequacy. A HPE
thus can simply be an explanation that is not correct or not known to be correct. But, of course, many
accounts require the (approximate) truth of the explanans for understanding (e.g. Strevens 2013; Trout
2007; Woodward 2003).
11There is also a distinction to be made between understanding with a theory or model, also sometimes
called objectual understanding (see Khalifa 2013a; Kvanvig 2003), and understanding why. We are here
only concerned with the latter. It is thus possible to understand combustion with phlogiston theory while
not understanding why. To understand why some externals conditions of adequacy need to be fulfilled.
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Ptolemaic astronomy provided an internally correct explanation of the motion of the
planets using a geocentric cosmology and epicycles. But since the theory is false
because it depicts, among other things, the earth at the centre of the solar system and
planets as moving along epicycles, it is not externally correct and thus not a HAE.
In practice, the difference between HPEs and HAEs is more like a spectrum.12
Sometimes we have some evidence or degree of confirmation that a HPE may be a
HAE. HAEs may also be approximately true. Or HAEs can also vary in their explana-
tory power, scope, or breadth (see, e.g., Schupbach and Sprenger 2011; Woodward
2003; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). Strevens (2013, 513-514), in his defence of
the necessity of explanation, also acknowledges that explanatory correctness comes
in degree. But other times, we decidedly know that we only have a HPE, not a HAE.
These are the cases that are of special interest for our consideration of the necessity
of explanation.
For the purpose of my argument, what is important to bear in mind is that what
narrow KAU requires for understanding is to have a HAE, not merely a HPE. The tex-
tual evidence of the previous section makes this plain. Strevens explicitly denies that
potential explanations—or HPEs—afford understanding of phenomena. He indicates
that grasping a correct explanation “requires grasping that the propositions express-
ing a relevant model’s explanatory content are true, or in other words, understanding
that the states of affairs represented by those propositions obtain” (2013, 512). This
requirement is clearly not satisfied by most cases of HPEs discussed in the literature
since they depict either false—or not known to be true—explanantia or explananda.
Their explanatory content is false and therefore one can’t, according to narrow KAU,
reap understanding from them. The issue therefore does not hinge on whether HPEs
are a species of explanation. The issue is rather whether a HAE is necessary for
understanding. According to proponents of the second tenet of narrow KAU, it is.
4 HPEs and narrow KAU
Yet, that HAEs are not necessary for understanding is precisely what some prac-
titioners maintain and what contemporary philosophical discussions of theoretical
modelling show. I examine here cases where HPEs provide understanding without
actually explaining.
An oft-discussed example in the literature on HPEs is Schelling’s (1971, 1978)
checkerboard model of residential segregation. According to Sugden (2000, 2),
an economist himself, the checkerboard model “tells us something important and
true about the real world”. Clark and Fosset (2008, 4109), both social scientists,
consider that the model “was critical in providing a theoretical basis for viewing
residential preferences as relevant to understanding the ethnic patterns observed
in metropolitan areas”. Prior to the checkerboard model, social scientists believed
that only strong discriminatory preferences—i.e., racism—could lead to residential
12For instance, between the potential and true explanations, Hempel (1965, 338) also proposed the ‘more
or less strongly supported or confirmed’ explanation.
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segregation (Aydinonat 2007; Clark and Fossett 2008; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009; Sugden
2000). The model showed that it was possible that preferences for not being in a
minority status could also produce the same pattern of segregation. This result has
proven to be very robust across changes of assumptions (Muldoon et al. 2012).
The checkerboard model is usually interpreted as having provided a HPE of
residential segregation (e.g. Aydinonat 2007; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2013a; Kuorikoski and
Ylikoski 2015; Weisberg 2013; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). The model does not
make any specific claim about the actual mechanism producing instances of residen-
tial segregation. More precisely, it is not a HAE of segregation since we do not know
whether it explains any actual instance of that phenomenon. Instead, it answers a gen-
eral how-possibly question, namely “how is it possible for segregation to happen in a
city without collective preferences for segregation” (Weisberg 2013, 118-119)? Even
though the model represents phenomena in a highly stylized manner and despite that
the mechanism it depicts is not known to be actual, it still appears to provide causal
knowledge about the phenomenon. Using the model, we know that if the mechanism
were true, under suitable conditions residential segregation could be brought about.
We know that it could actually depend on those factors or, conversely, that it does not
necessarily depend on strong discriminatory preferences (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009; Reiss
2008; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). Knowing that some causal factors may bring
about residential segregation improves our understanding of the phenomenon even
though we do not know what actually causes it. It may do it in various ways. It can ex-
pand our ‘menu’ of possible explanations (Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). It can also
license ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ inferences about phenomena (Kuorikoski
and Ylikoski 2015; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). Or it can contradict impossibility
theses scientists hold (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009). All these accounts suggest the checker-
board model, interpreted as providing a HPE, can afford understanding of real-world
phenomena.
Another widely discussed example in the literature on HPEs (e.g. Sugden 2009;
Rice 2016; Rohwer and Rice 2013), this time at the intersection of biology and
economics, is the ‘Hawk-Dove’ model (Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard
Smith and Parker 1976; Maynard Smith 1982) of animal competition. The Hawk-
Dove is a game-theoretic model to study behaviour in situation of conflicts over
a shareable resource. The model shows that restraint in contest between individu-
als of the same species benefit not only the species as a whole (the group), but
also the individuals. Contrary to what was believed, a ‘limited war’ strategy can
also benefit individuals’ fitness. It is not necessary to resort to group selection to
explain that behaviour, individual selection is sufficient. Commenting on this type
of modelling, Maynard Smith (1978, 52) said that “[t]he role of optimization the-
orizing in biology is not to demonstrate that organisms optimize. Rather, they are
an attempt to understand the diversity of life”. In a similar vein, biologists Arnott
and Elwood (2008, 529) note that our “understanding of this variation [of forms
of contests for resources] was boosted by the application of game theory (Maynard
Smith and Price 1973; Parker 1974), which examined how different strategies might
be used by each contestant and how the winner is determined”. In the eyes of
practitioners, the Hawk-Dove model contributed to our understanding of animal
competition.
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Like the checkerboard model, it also should not be viewed as a HAE. While pro-
viding a rationale for their research, Maynard Smith and Price wrote that “[a] main
reason for using computer simulation was to test whether it is possible even in the-
ory for individual selection to account for ‘limited war’ behaviour” (1973, 15). Their
goal was not to provide a HAE of animal contest, but to study whether it could have
evolved via individual selection. One philosophical interpretation of the Hawk-Dove
model in line with the practitioners’ judgments is that it “produces some under-
standing of how individual selection could possibly lead to restraint in situations of
animal conflict” (Rohwer and Rice 2013, 341). It does not answer a how-actually
question, but instead aims to answer a how-possibly one, namely how individual
selection could bring about restraint in combat (see also Rice 2016; Rohwer and Rice
2016). That this phenomenon may be the result of individual selection does not imply
it is actually the case. Nonetheless, Rohwer and Rice (2013) argue that it affords
understanding because it justifies the true belief that the restraint phenomenon is
compatible with individual selection. According to them, this belief is relevant to
answer the question why this phenomenon occurs.
Even though they do not satisfy the typical empirical external conditions associ-
ated with HAEs, both the judgement of practitioners and philosophical analyses of
specific cases of theoretical modelling lead to the conclusion that HPEs can pro-
vide understanding. Proponents of the second tenet of narrow KAU could dispute
this conclusion on two grounds. They could contend that HPEs are, in fact, explana-
tions in the required sense of narrow KAU. Or, they could deny that HPEs can afford
understanding. However, neither horn of the dilemma is readily available to them.
Firstly, it is implausible to regard all HPEs as being HAEs. Reydon (2012), for
instance, argues that what Forber (2010) calls global HPEs are actually genuine
explanations of type-level phenomena.13 Since the point of narrow KAU is precisely
that only HAEs can provide understanding, this would be a successful way of defus-
ing the claim that HPEs can afford understanding. Yet, the fact that some HPEs
should perhaps rather be considered as HAEs does not exclude that others are gen-
uine HPEs. As I already pointed out, Strevens (2013) stresses that an explanation
must be externally correct, that is, it must contain a true explanans, in order to afford
understanding. HPEs, by definition, do not satisfy these criteria because either the
explanans or the explanandum is false or not known to be true. HPEs fail in some way
or another to be HAEs. Furthermore, there are clearly cases—e.g., the ones discussed
above—that do not satisfy the empirical conditions of adequacy. Insofar as empirical
support is lacking for the explanans, models similar to the checkerboard or the Hawk-
Dove examples can’t qualify as HAEs. So even though some HPEs could better
be viewed as HAEs, not all can. For this reason, narrow KAU can’t account for them.
Secondly, rejecting the claim that some HPEs afford understanding implies
that exemplary cases of theoretical modelling are epistemically suspect. The
checkerboard and Hawk-Dove models have been very influential and, most impor-
tantly, have been considered to afford cognitive benefits in the form of understanding.
13Forber (2012) claims nothing really hinges on that distinction because for him global how-possibly
explanations are a kind of explanations.
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That many contemporary philosophical accounts as well as practitioners consider
some HPEs afford understanding is strong evidence that they actually do so. As far as
practice is correctly described, the burden of proof should be on those philosophical
accounts that want to deny HPEs can afford understanding, not on practitioners.
In a related but separate discussion, Fumagalli (2015, 2016) argues that both the
checkerboard and the Hawk-Dove models, interpreted as ‘minimal models’—that is,
models that supposedly lack any representational features—can’t justify a change of
confidence in necessity or impossibility theses (see Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009). The chec-
kerboard model, for instance, affects our confidence in the thesis that only strong
discriminatory preferences can bring about residential segregation. Fumagalli may be
right as far as minimal models thus defined are concerned. But this does not imply that
HPEs need be minimal models. Actually, the mistake seems to rest in regarding the
checkerboard and the Hawk-Dove models as minimal. The checkerboard model may
afford understanding precisely in virtue of some similarity or resemblance between
the world and the model (Sugden 2009; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014). To consider
that the mechanism depicted by the checkerboard model is causally possible indeed
appears to require at least a minimal assessment of its similarity with the actual world.
One could nevertheless argue, as Resnik (1991) and Reydon (2012) do, that HPEs
are in fact HAEs or merely serve heuristic purposes because they are not HAEs. But
what is at stake is not whether HPEs are a species of explanations or not, but whether
they afford understanding. Reydon, for instance, does not specifically address this
issue. The fact that HPEs lack full empirical support does not necessarily imply that
they can’t afford understanding. HPEs may sometimes serve heuristic purposes, but
other times they may also afford understanding. The checkerboard model does both.
It suggests a novel empirical hypothesis that can orient future research, while also
allowing to answer various questions about residential segregation. The two functions
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
It might be the case that scientists are sometimes too optimistic about results from
HPEs or that they mistake some HPEs for HAEs. There might thus be cases of HPEs
that do not improve our understanding. However, such negative readings do not imply
that HPEs can’t, out of principle, afford understanding. Descriptively, denying this
capacity to HPEs is infelicitous as actual practitioners consider they afford under-
standing. However, the normative point may still hold, viz. that practitioners are in
fact mistaken. That said, proponents of narrow KAU would need to offer a plausible
argument for why we should consider they are indeed mistaken. Arguments of that
kind are currently lacking.
If HPEs may afford understanding, as it is plausible they sometimes do, then nar-
row KAU faces a serious objection: it appears that having an explanation, in the
sense of a HAE, is not necessary for understanding. Whereas HAEs of course afford
understanding, HPEs may also.
5 Broad KAU
The two tenets of narrowKAU are untenable. First, the literature on non-causal expla-
nations provides good reasons to believe that causal knowledge is not necessary for
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understanding. Second, as I have argued, there are cases of theoretical modelling
that do not provide explanations and yet, according to practitioners and philosophers,
afford understanding. This indicates that having an explanation is also not necessary
for understanding.
Therefore, if we want our epistemology of understanding to apply to cases of the-
oretical modelling, then we need an alternative to narrow KAU, in general, and to
its second tenet, in particular. Broad KAU, I contend, provides an alternative epis-
temology of understanding that fulfils the desiderata set forth in the introduction.
In particular, accounting for scientific practice should not come at the cost of blur-
ring the difference between illusory and genuine understanding. It should also make
salient the relationship between explanation and understanding.
Broad KAU 1) broadens the knowledge—i.e., not only knowledge of causes—
that affords understanding and 2) broadens the ways this knowledge can be acquired.
Broad KAU thus challenges that causal knowledge and that having an explanation are
necessary for understanding. More formally, broad KAU contradicts narrow KAU in
two ways:
1. It asserts that causal knowledge is not necessary.
2. It asserts that having an explanation is not necessary.
One fruitful way of advancing towards a more formal characterization of broad KAU
is to look at Reutlinger’s (2016) theory of counterfactual explanation. This is because
it already embraces one element of broad KAU, namely it welcomes non-causal
knowledge. Reutlinger’s theory aims at capturing the ‘common element’ of causal
and non-causal types of explanation without necessarily being tied to an interven-
tionist interpretation of counterfactuals. Reutlinger’s strategy is to stay as close as
possible to the Woodwardian (2003) spirit of causal explanation, while making room
for non-causal generalizations to serve as explanantia. An important motivation of
his is precisely to accommodate mathematical explanations such as the widely dis-
cussed Ko¨nigsberg bridges case (see, e.g., Pincock 2007). According to Reutlinger, a
relation between an explanans and an explanandum is explanatory iff it satisfies the
following conditions (2016, 737):
Veridicality condition Generalizations G1, . . . ,Gm, the auxiliary statements
S1, . . . , Sn, and the explanandum statement E must all be (approximately) true or
be well confirmed.
Implication condition G1, . . . ,Gm and S1, . . . , Sn logically entail E or a condi-
tional probability P(E|S1, . . . , Sn).
Dependency condition G1, . . . ,Gm support at least one counterfactual between
S1, . . . , Sn and E.
Since Reutlinger’s theory allows for non-causal generalizations, it already incor-
porates the first tenet of broad KAU. The conditions he states are those that
explanations (i.e., HAEs) must satisfy. Accordingly, his theory leaves out the second
tenet of broad KAU, viz. that an explanation is not necessary for understanding.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science            (2019) 9:18 Page 11 of 20   18 
The first step that will allow us to filter out understanding from explanation
is by identifying in virtue of what explanations provide understanding. To put it
in Lipton’s (2009) terms, we have to separate the benefit explanations provide—
understanding—from the explanations themselves. Reutlinger is not explicit about
this, but since his theory is an extension of Woodward’s (2003), we can find indi-
cations there. For Woodward, explanations provide understanding because they
convey information that is relevant to answering ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’
questions about a phenomenon of interest. One understands when one obtains infor-
mation about counterfactual dependence that allows to answer these questions. We
thus see that what is key to understanding is the information some propositions
provide, information that is closely related to the satisfaction of the dependency
condition.
Broad KAU expands on the idea that it is essentially information about coun-
terfactual dependence that contributes to understanding, regardless of whether it is
causal or not, and, crucially, regardless of whether it is obtained through an expla-
nation or not. Reutlinger’s theory already accommodates non-causal dependence by
modifying the dependency condition. Having an explanation implies that certain
relations of dependence actually obtain. This information that explanations provide
allows to answer ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions. But is it possible
to answer some ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions about a phenomenon
even if the relations of dependence are not actual? The challenge for broad KAU,
therefore, is to show that having an explanation is not necessary for satisfying
the dependency condition. Put differently, how could the dependency condition,
which appears to be essential for understanding, be satisfied without the veridicality
condition?
Reutlinger proposes an account of explanation and explanations are usually taken
to be factive, i.e., they give true accounts of the facts. The function of the veridical-
ity condition is precisely to ensure the factivity of explanation. False generalizations
would not explain an explanandum and true generalizations would not explain an
explanandum that is known to be false. For a set of propositions to count as an
explanation, both the explanans and the explanandum must be true. But what if the
veridicality condition is not satisfied? What if the generalizations are false or not
known to be true? What if the explanans or explanandum are merely possible? Put
differently, what if we have a HPE? According to Reutlinger’s account, this would
imply the relationship is not explanatory. However, if we accept the compelling evi-
dence that HPEs may provide understanding despite the fact that they contain false
explanantia or explananda, then this suggests that the veridicality condition is not
necessary for understanding. Since we can obtain understanding from false explanan-
tia or explananda, the veridicality condition may be necessary for explanation, but
not for understanding.
This indicates that we can disentangle the condition for actual explanation in Reut-
linger from the core constituents that specifically concern understanding. We can
achieve this result, I submit, simply by amending the veridicality condition. Accord-
ingly, we can modify the theory of explanation to achieve a theory of understanding.
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I propose that the relationship between an explanans and an explanandum affords
understanding iff:
Possibility condition The generalizations G1, . . . ,Gm, the auxiliary statements
S1, . . . , Sn, or the explanandum statement E are (im)possible according to the
relevant modal interpretation and epistemic goal.
Implication condition Generalizations G1, . . . ,Gm with the auxiliary statements
S1, . . . , Sn logically entail E or a conditional probability P(E|S1, . . . , Sn).
Dependency condition G1, . . . ,Gm support at least one counterfactual between
S1, . . . , Sn and E.
In other words, I propose to amend the veridicality condition for what I call the
possibility condition.14 Essentially, it relaxes the explanatory requirement that the
explanans and explanandum be actual. What is actual is possible, but what is possible
is not necessarily actual. Explanations require that all its constituents are actual, but
not understanding.
This fits very well with accounts of HPEs that view them as describing “how a set
of parts and activitiesmight be organized such that they exhibit the explanandum phe-
nomenon” (Craver 2006, 361, my emphasis; see also Verreault-Julien 2018). They
show how an event could possibly occur or how known processes can lead to dif-
ferent outcomes. This, in turn, affords understanding of real-world phenomena. For
instance, the checkerboard model exhibits a possible causal mechanism—possible
causal generalization—that can bring about residential segregation, which is an actual
phenomenon. However, the model itself does not explain residential segregation
because we do not know whether it is actually that mechanism that produces seg-
regation. Yet, the checkerboard model affords understanding by virtue of showing
how it could be brought about. It supports counterfactuals of the form ‘If individu-
als had not strong discriminatory preferences, then residential segregation could still
occur’. More generally, it allows to make various counterfactual inferences about the
phenomenon of residential segregation (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015; Ylikoski and
Aydinonat 2014). Despite the fact that it does not satisfy the veridicality condition,
it does satisfy the possibility and the dependency conditions. If it were the case that
preferences for not living in a minority status cause the phenomenon, then we would
have an explanation. We would also of course understand. But we can also understand
even when we lack an explanation insofar as the dependency condition is satisfied.
The “(im)possible according to the relevant modal interpretation and epistemic
goal” clause within the possibility condition makes explicit that 1) there are various
ways we can deem a proposition to be (im)possible (Lange 2009; Kment 2012) and
2) that understanding is achieved on the background of a specific epistemic goal.
Many HPEs, for instance the checkerboard model, display possible causal depen-
dence. However, other cases may appeal to different modalities (e.g., epistemic,
nomic, metaphysical, etc.). In mathematical explanations, the relevant modality is
mathematical or logical. The truth or falsehood of possibility claims is reached on
14Reutlinger and others (Reutlinger 2017; Reutlinger et al. 2018) themselves suggest that HPEs do not
satisfy the veridicality condition. The possibility condition I put forward is a novel proposal.
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the background of the suitable facts, depending both on the modality and on the epis-
temic goal. To say that something is logically possible does not imply that it is also
causally possible. The same constraints do not apply. For the purpose of scientific
understanding, causal, epistemic, or nomic possibility are perhaps the most relevant
types. Broad KAU, however, does not rule out a priori the sorts of possibilities or
relations of dependence that may afford understanding.
To make this clearer, let us use an example discussed by Strevens (2013), that of
the young earth creationists. They purportedly explain the formation of the Grand
Canyon by citing one massive flood occurring over a short period of time. The flood
would have laid down most of the different rock layers and the flood would have
dug the canyon itself. Strevens says that he “cannot think of any conversational
context in which it is correct to say, without frantic hedging, that the young earth
creationists understand the formation of the Grand Canyon” (2013, 513). That they
do not understand follows from Strevens’s requirement that one needs to grasp a cor-
rect explanation in order to understand. The great flood explanation is false, i.e., its
explanans is not true in the sense that it is not actual. The Grand Canyon was actu-
ally formed by other geological processes, namely by sediment accumulation, plate
movement, and slow erosion. Recent evidence suggests large parts of the canyon may
be as old as 70 million years (Flowers and Farley 2012), a far cry from the young
creationists’ claim.15
But does relaxing the veridicality condition imply that comparable cases may sat-
isfy the possibility condition and thus afford understanding? If so, it may imply that
the possibility condition is too liberal since utterly wrong-headed HPEs could afford
understanding. Since one desideratum of an account of understanding is to allow
demarcation of illusory from genuine understanding, this would be an unwelcome
implication of broad KAU. Again, offering a descriptively adequate epistemology of
understanding should not make it too easy to obtain.
I agree with Strevens that the young earth creationists’ great flood explanation
does not afford understanding. Here, it is important to take into consideration what is
the relevant modal interpretation for a given epistemic purpose. This allows to clarify
how exactly a HPE contributes, or not, to understanding. If one asks ‘How possibly
could have the Grand Canyon been formed?’, the question can most appropriately be
interpreted as a request for causal information about the Grand Canyon. One wants
to know how the Grand Canyon could have possibly been causally formed. Hence,
not only is the young earth creationists’ great flood explanation actually false, but
according to what we know about geological processes, this could not have happened
the way the young earth creationists claim. In other words, the great flood explanation
does not qualify as being a HPE and is not an appropriate answer to the how-possible
question above.16
15The age of the Grand Canyon is an on-going debate. Scientific advocates of a ‘young’ canyon date its
origin to about 5–6 million years. In any case, we are still far from the young earth creationists who claim
the earth was formed between five and ten thousand years ago.
16Of course, young earth creationists would most probably disagree with this statement. The flood causing
the formation of the Grand Canyon is consistent with their other background beliefs. Here I am assuming
that the geological sciences provide reliable empirical information.
   18 Page 14 of 20 European Journal for Philosophy of Science            (2019) 9:18 
By that, I mean that the causal generalization linking the flood to the canyon is
not only inconsistent with what we know about the causal history of this specific
case, but also with other more general causal facts. It conflicts with the fact that geo-
logical processes forming canyons operate over long periods of time, not during one
year. And while floods may produce certain geological formations (e.g., the Chan-
neled Scablands in the US, see Baker and Bunker 1985; Waitt 1980), the floods are
local, not global. It also contradicts scientific facts about the age of the earth and of
the Grand Canyon. Or it can hardly account for the presence of fossils in the differ-
ent rock layers. What makes the young earth creationists’ explanation an inadequate
answer to the how-possible question is not so much the fact that floods can play a
causal role, but the precise way they claimed it happened and how inconsistent it is
with everything else we know about geological processes. In a nutshell, it just could
not have happened the way the young earth creationists claim. The great flood expla-
nation thus does not fulfil the possibility condition since the how-possibly request
calls for information about causal possibility, which the young earth creationists do
not provide.
It also does not satisfy the dependency condition because the generalization
linking floods and the Grand Canyon does not support the right kind of (true)
counterfactuals. For instance, the young earth creationists’ explanation implies that
the following counterfactual is true: ‘Had there been a great flood, the Grand
Canyon would have been formed as a result’. However, that counterfactual is false.
Perhaps if other geological processes would also have been sufficiently different
the flood could have formed the canyon, but this qualification is not part of the
young earth creationists’ story. Absent changes to these other processes, the flood
would not have brought about the Grand Canyon. It is at best unclear what sort
of ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions the great flood explanation may
answer.
All that said, since the possibility condition allows for impossible explanantia and
explananda, does this mean the great flood generalization would, on reflection, afford
understanding? It could, but only in a specific set of circumstances. Let us suppose
that we did not know that a flood during a very short period of time could have dug the
canyon and laid down the rock layers, but that we did know that the actual explanation
involved erosion, sediment accumulation, and plate movement. One question we may
ask ourselves is whether other causes, like the flood, could have brought it about. We
may thus build a model or simulation in which we try to generate the Grand Canyon
with an intense flood as the main causal driving force. In order to achieve this result,
we would most probably need to assume very different geological conditions and
processes than the ones currently existing. In doing so, we would thus learn about
the contingency, or necessity, of the actual explanation. We would also learn to what
extent the actual world would need to be different for the flood to have the capacity
to form the canyon. As Weisberg argues in discussing similar examples of impossible
explananda, modelling the impossible is a sound scientific practice which may afford
understanding.
Why should theorists who are primarily interested in studying what is
actual try to understand what isn’t actual? The answer to this question cuts
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deep into the heart of theoretical practice: Theorists ultimately aim to par-
tition the space of possibilities. They aim to understand what is possible, what
is impossible, and why (Weisberg 2013, 128).
What this shows is that whether a given HPE affords understanding or not depends
on what is exactly achieved and on the context of enquiry. Whereas the young earth
creationists’ specific ‘explanation’ brings nothing to the table in terms of understand-
ing, we can imagine slightly different scenarios where investigating the conditions
under which a flood could have formed the Grand Canyon would yield understand-
ing. We understand better the Grand Canyon if we establish, say, that it is impossible
to generate it with known initial conditions and a great flood as a possible process.
Or that it is possible that a flood forms the Grand Canyon, but only if the world
would have been a very different place. These generalizations may for instance sup-
port the counterfactual that ‘Had there been a flood, the canyon would not have
been formed as a result’. The crucial difference between this illustrative case and
the young earth creationists’ one is that the latter does not identify relevant possible
causal generalizations and that these generalizations do not support counterfactuals.
Another way of illustrating this point is to briefly consider the cases of phlogis-
ton theory or Ptolemaic astronomy. As I said in Section 3, both theories rely on
false generalizations and therefore do not explain. Looking at these cases with our
contemporary eyes, shall we say that they afford understanding?17 Our account of
understanding should view these cases as offering at best a limited understanding
of nature. As with the young earth creationists’ case, much depends on what we
take the relevant ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions to be. Both theories
are famously unable to answer some questions that concern the phenomena they are
supposed to explain. For instance, phlogiston theory has trouble supporting coun-
terfactuals concerning the combustion of metals since some gain weight instead of
losing it. Moreover, not only are their generalizations false, they provide a wrong-
headed picture of the world. So perhaps we might say that they depict impossible
explanantia—e.g., the earth at the centre of the universe—, but whether phlogiston
theory or Ptolemaic astronomy would satisfy the possibility and dependency condi-
tions again depends on the epistemic goal and what sort of counterfactuals are under
investigation. For example, one might be interested in exploring what difference it
would make if the earth were at the centre of the universe. This may help understand
why the world is the way it is. However, that is a different epistemic goal than what
Ptolemaic astronomy purported to do.
My proposed account of the conditions under which the relationship between an
explanans and an explanandum affords understanding, therefore, has the resources
to discriminate between genuine and specious cases of understanding. While broad
KAU seeks to be as accommodating as possible in order to reflect actual scientific
practice, it also imposes limits on what can count as affording understanding. The
possibility and dependency conditions provide criteria according to which we can
assess whether or not a relationship affords understanding.
17I want to set aside the question whether phlogiston theory, for instance, increased understanding of its
contemporaries. This is out of the scope of this article.
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One final objection may be the following: does discarding the veridicality con-
dition imply that understanding is not factive? Reutlinger’s (2016) veridicality
condition originates from the usual requirement that explanations are factive. Wemay
not need factive explanations for understanding, but we still want understanding to
be factive. How can we have factive understanding without (factive) explanation? We
can because the function of the veridicality condition, as it is formulated, is simply to
ensure the relationship could be part of an actual explanation, not that it would afford
understanding. An explanation is constituted by an actual explanandum and an actual
explanans. A possible or false explanans does not explain an actual explanandum.
That being said, a relationship that does not satisfy the veridicality condition may
afford understanding. Indeed, it should not obscure the fact that generalizations can
still support counterfactuals, and thus satisfy the dependency condition, even if the
explanans or the explanandum are merely possible. This is, in fact, the determining
component of understanding. As we have seen above, it is information that allows to
answer ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions that is relevant for understand-
ing (Grimm 2010; Woodward 2003). Explanations provide that kind of information,
as HPEs can do. We can truthfully answer some ‘what-if’ questions even when we
lack the actual explanation. For example, the checkerboard model shows that resi-
dential segregation could, in suitable conditions, be brought about if individuals had
certain preferences. Since we consider the mechanism to be causally possible, we can
use that information to answer ‘what-if’ questions. It, therefore, satisfies the depen-
dency condition. To know that an explanandum may depend on a possible explanans
is genuine knowledge of dependence and is, in that sense, factive. Likewise, that a
possible explanans supports at least one counterfactual implies that we can evalu-
ate its truth. Understanding is therefore still factive because it relies on matters of
facts about possibility and counterfactuals. One would not understand without knowl-
edge of possibility or without truthful assessment of counterfactuals. Knowing that
something is possible responds to facts about possibility. This makes understanding
factive. Broad KAU therefore does not necessarily come at the cost of having to reject
the factivity of understanding.18
6 Conclusion
Neither tenet of narrow KAU is necessary. In other words, understanding does not
depend on causal explanation. Amending Reutlinger’s (2016) theory of counterfac-
tual explanation as suggested above yields a sound basis for an epistemology based
on broad KAU. Upholding narrow KAU comes at the price of having an epistemol-
ogy of understanding that can’t appraise neither descriptively nor normatively current
scientific practices like theoretical modelling. We do not have to pay that price. Broad
KAU can easily accommodate the view according to which some HPEs afford under-
standing even though they do not actually explain. Broad KAU thus has a lot of appeal
since it coheres with the actual conduct of science. It therefore fulfils an important
18Some (e.g. Elgin 2007; Kvanvig 2003) maintain that understanding is non-factive. Whether it is or not
has no direct implication for the account just presented.
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desideratum of an account of understanding, namely that it should not regard vast
areas of science as being mistaken about what they achieve. That said, broad KAU’s
flexibility does not come at the cost of blurring the distinction between illusory and
genuine understanding. The possibility condition I propose, while accommodating,
is not a free ticket to understanding.
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